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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-STOP-PAYMENT ORDER-ATTEMPT
TO LIMIT BANK'S LIABILITY IN PAYING AFTER
NOTIFIED NOT TO
In a recent case, Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton,' one of first impression in this Commonwealth, the facts were these: The plaintiff, Thomas, was
a depositor with defendant bank. On October 12, 1950, the plaintiff delivered
his check, drawn on the bank, to Sabor Dental Supply House, as payee, for the
sum of $1225. The next day, the plaintiff, wishing to stop payment on the check,
went to defendant bank, and there signed a "Request to Stop Payment." The
printed form was supplied by the bank. Among other things, the form contained
the following: "Should the check be paid through inadvertence, accident, or oversight, it is expressly agreed that the bank will in no way be held responsible. The
Bank receives this request upon the express condition that it shall not be in any
way liable for its act should the check be paid by it in the course of its business.
The undersigned agrees to be legally bound hereby." Subsequently, the bank did
pay the check (three days later to be exact) "through inadvertence, accident, or
oversight," and the amount was charged to the plaintiff's account. Thereupon,
the plaintiff instituted suit to recover the $1225.
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, the case was decided
in plaintiff's favor.2 On appeal to the Superior Court, the decision was reversed
by a unanimous tribunal.8 This decision was also appealed, and the Supreme Court,
with one dissent, reversed the Superior Court holding, and reinstituted the judgment of the Lackawanna County Court.
It is well settled by the common law of Pennsylvania that in the absence of a
release given by the depositor, a bank is liable to the drawer of a check for payment after the bank has received a proper order not to pay. 4 Htre, however, the
plaintiff, in utilizing his right to stop payment, signed an agreement which released the bank from any liability in the event the bank did pay the check ordered
stopped, even if the check was paid by "inadvertence, accident, or oversight."
The question: is such an agreement, whereby a bank contracts away its liability
for its negligence, valid? The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held it was not, deciding such agreements are against public policy.
The court first establishes that the bank was negligent, when it declares as
a matter of law that:
1 376 Pa. 181, 101 A. 2d 910, (1954).
2 Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 53 Lack. Jur. 105 (1950).
8 Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 173 Pa. Sup. 205 (1953).
4 German Nat. Bank v. Farmers' Dep. Nat. Bank, 118 Pa. 294, 12 A. 303 (1888); Wall v.
Franklin Trust Co., 84 Pa. Sup. 392 (1925) ; Weller v. The Broad Street Nat. Bank, 15 D. & C.
321 (1931); Steiner v. Germantown Trust Co., 104 Pa. Sup. 38 (1932); Hunsberger v. Nat.
Bank and Trust Co. of Schwenksville, 38 D. & C. 323 (1940).
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"Payment by the bank of the check after notice to stop its payment was failure to exercise due care, precaution, and vigilance. This
constituted negligence, even though the failure to exercise proper care
had been due to 'inadvertence, accident, or oversight.' "5
Apparently what the court is saying is that payment by a bank of a check
ordered stopped, if the stop payment order was received seasonably, constitutes
negligence per se. This, if true, will have obvious ramifications in matters of
pleading and burden of proof.
Having established negligence, the court next deals with the written release,
signed by the plaintiff, which if given effect, would absolve the bank of any negligence in erroneous payment of the check. In declaring such an agreement is
against public policy, the court said:
"Banks, like common carriers, utility companies, etc., perform an
important public service. The United States Government and the Commonwealth respectively stipulate how banks... shall be incorporated and
organized. All banks are examined and supervised by government and
state officers with extreme particularity ....

The situation of a depositor

is quite analagous to that of a passenger on a public carrier. . . This
court has consistently decided that it is against public policy to permit a
common carrier to limit its liability for its own negligence (cases cited) ."
In so deciding, the Supreme Court directly reversed the holding of the Superior Court, which had said that such a release "is not rendered inoperative on
the ground of public policy," 7 because "one is not obliged to agree to a limitation
of the common law obligation of a bank to honor an unequivocal stop payment
order but if he does, his release. . .is enforceable insofar as it8 contains a clear
expression of his intentions since no public interest is involved."
This difference of view between the two appellate courts of the Commonwealth is also reflected in the decisions of other states. There appears to be no
unanimity in other jurisdictions as to whether such releases are valid, or are against
public policy. A majority allows them. 9 Other jurisdictions find them against
public policy. 10 Up until this case, it was not clear in which camp Pennsylvania
stood. Defendant bank in this case cited and relied on Cohen v. State Bank of
1 1 which he claimed brought
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania into the group adopting
the majority view. In that case, plaintiff made a check to the order of one Levin,
drawn on defendant bank. Plaintiff gave the check to Arkin, who was to deliver it to the payee, Levin. While Arkin was asleep, Levin took the check from
5 Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, at 184.
6 Ibid., at 185, 186.
7 Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 173 Pa. Sup. 205, at 208.
8 Ibid.
9 Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920) ; Gaita v. Windsor Bank,
251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929) ; Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E.
488 (1933); Edwards v. Nat. City Bank, 150 Misc. 80, 269 N.Y.S. 637 (1934); Pyramid
Musical Corp. v. Floral Park Bank, 268 App. Div. 783, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 866 (1944).

10 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Calif. App. 362, 248 P. 94.7 (1926); Speoff v, Firmt Nat
Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E. 2d 119 (1948).
11 69 Pa. Sup. 40 (1918).
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his pocket, and kept it without notifying anyone. When Arkin discovered the
loss, he immediately notified the plaintiff of it, whereupon the plaintiff (maker
of the check) directed the bank to stop payment on the missing check. In this
case, plaintiff signed a form, which stated, among other things, "I ask this [the
stop payment) as an act of courtesy. . .in consideration [of which I]release the
State Bank of Philadelphia from liability on account thereof. . .inthe event of
payment of said check by error on the part of the State Bank of Philadelphia...."
After having done this, plaintiff learned that the check was in Levin's possession.
Despite this knowledge, the plaintiff drew another check to Levin's order, this
one larger than the first, and including the amount of the first check. Levin
promptly presented both checks at the bank where they were honored. Upon
learning of this, the plaintiff sued. The validity of the written release was upheld,
and judgment was for defendant bank. But the court limited its decision to the
facts of the case. It said:
"The plaintiff, although he knew that the first check was in Levin's
(payee) possession, instead of withdrawing the stop payment order [as
to that check] took the doubtful course of giving him another check for
a larger sum including, however, the amount of the first check.... We
see no reason why, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff
should not be bound by the terms of the stop payment order. We do not
say that such an order would protect the bank under all circumstances.
We think it does in this case."
The court seems to imply that, if anything, it was the contributory negligence of the plaintiff in the Cohen case which led to the loss, not so much the
bank's negligence. Be that as it may, the court in the Thomas case felt that the
facts of the Cohen case were "sui generis and inapposite" to those of the former,
and gave the decision of the Cohen case no weight.
There is a matter of some importance which lies in the background of this
Thomas case. A stop payment order with a stipulation against liability for the
bank's negligence is a contract, which must contain all the elements thereof. One
of these is consideration. Obviously if consideration is lacking there is no contract, and so an order to stop payment with a release from negligence without
this requisite would be invalid for that reason, before it could be decided as a
matter of law whether such an agreement was or was not against public policy.12
In this case, however, the agreement satisfied the consideration requirement. The
plaintiff signed an instrument which contained the provision that the signer "agrees
to be legally bound hereby." These or similar words in a written release or promise
have been held to import consideration,' 3 by authority of the Uniform Written
112Michaels v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 51 Lack. Jur. 181 (1949); Reinhardt v. PassaicClifton Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 16 N.J. Sup. 430, 84 A. 2d
13 Rekas v. Dopkavich, 362 Pa. 292 (1949); Central Penn
(1945); Aliquippa Nat. Bank to the use of Woodlawn Trust
2d 409 (1941); Galvavoni and Levy Brothers v. Acquadero,

(1943).

741 (1951).
Nat. Bank v. Tinkler, 351 Pa. 123
Co. v. Harvey, 340 Pa. 223, 16 A.
46 D. & C. 358, 44 Lack. Jur. 111
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Obligations Act. 14 With this element out of the way, the court here had to decide
squarely on the issue of public policy in concluding the validity or invalidity of
such a written release of negligence running to the bank in a stop payment order.
Dismay by bankers at the decision of the Thomas case cannot, apparently, be
leavened with the hope that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will reverse itself. Ostensibly, the ruling of this case will become statutory law on July 1, 1954,
when the Uniform Commercial Code becomes effective in this state.' 5 Section
4-403(1) states:
"A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item
payable for his account but the order must be received at such time and
in such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on
it prior to any action by the bank (where the bank has already) (quoting
now from section 4-303)
a. accepted and certified the item;
b. paid the item in cash;
c. settled for the item by separate remittance for the particular item;
d. completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of
the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith or otherwise has evidenced by 'examination of such indicated account and
by action its decision to pay the item, or
e. become liable for the item under section 4-302 dealing with the payor
bank's liability for late return of items."
This, in a more complete statement, is the depositor's rights today. That is,
he has a right to stop payment of a check drawn on his account, if he notifies the
bank in a reasonable time. 16 It is section 4-103(1) of the Code which the holding
of this case anticipates:
"The effect of the provisions of this Article (Bank Deposits and
Collections) may be waived by agreement except that no agreement can
disclaim a bank s responsibility or limit the measure of damages for its
own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care."
Of course the wording of the Code is broad enough to allow the courts at
a future time to say that payment of a check ordered stopped, through "inadvertence, accident, or oversight," does not, per se, constitute a breach of ordinary
care. Comment 8 to section 4-403 of the Code says that "payment in violation of
an effective direction to stop payment is an improper payment, even though it is
made by mistake or inadvertance." However, comment 4 to section 4-103 says
that by ordinary care the drafters of the Code mean "its normal tort meaning and
not in any special sense relating to bank collections." These comments may some14 Act of May 13, 1927 P.L. 985, No. 475, § 1. The Act was held constitutional in Balliet v.
Fetter, 314 Pa. 284, 171 A. 466 (1934).
16 Act of April 1, 1953 P.L. 1, No. 1; 12A P.S.
16 See n. 4, supra.
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day bt the basis of arguments insisting that payment of checks over a stop payment order while improper, need not constitute negligence per se, as the holding
of the Thomas case indicates.
Furthermore, a future court might decide the holding of the Thomas case
inapplicable in a similar fact situation, because in the Thomas case, the analogy
is drawn to a common carrier, which of course owes a duty of great care, while the
Code calls only for the exercise of ordinary care.
On the other hand, the court in the Thomas case does cite section 4-103 (1) of
the Code, supra, in its decision by way of dictum,27 noting that it is soon to become effective. The mere mention of a statute not yet in operation and a particular
provision which the court hints as applicable, lends weight to the conjecture that
the Code, as far as Pennsylvania is concerned, will codify the holding of the
Thomas case.
Edward J. Greene
Member of the Middler Class

TORTS-PERSONAL INJURIES-ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
Recently in the case of Kopka et ux v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania'
a problem arose from which a decision was rendered which is unique to the law
of the Commonwealth. It involved the extent to which the doctrine of absolute
liability or liability without fault will be applied to a trespasser.
The Bell Telephone Company at the request of the residents of the township
had its engineers stake out a line along a road bordering the farm of the plaintiff,
Kopka. It then proceeded to obtain from the abutting property owners rights of
way for its poles. None was acquired from the plaintiff. At the direction of the
company one Jud Sedwick, additional defendant, proceeded to erect the necessary
poles to carry the line and for that purpose drilled holes along the right of way.
One of these holes was dug inside the road on plaintiff's property. The purpose
of the hole was to support an anchor rod, which was to anchor a guy wire to one
of the poles. The telephone company directed the placing of these holes. The
particular hole in question was six and one-half (61/2) feet deep and seventeen
(17) inches in diameter. Plaintiff was informed of this two days after the digging
of the hole and proceeded to make an investigation. It was the latter part of the
afternoon of a cloudy day and was beginning to darken. While he was attempting
to locate the hole the plaintiff's left leg slipped into it, and his injuries resulted.
17 Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, at 188.
1 371 Pa. 444, 91 A.2d 232 (1952).
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Testimony presented on behalf of the plaintiff was to the effect that this portion
of the field was covered with weeds, briars and morning glory vines. Testimony
also indicated that there was no mound or ring of dirt surrounding the hole. This
latter fact was contradicted by evidence presented on behalf of the defendant.
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him damages for
his personal injuries, from which finding the defendant appeals. The additional
defendant was absolved of all liability.
The interesting point to be noted from this case is that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court for the first time promulgated the theory of absolute liability with
respect to acts done by a trespasser upon another's land with respect to personal
injuries. To put the question in the language of the court:
"The liability of the defendant company for the trespass involved
in the digging the hole on plaintiff's land without his knowledge or consent being thus established, does such liability extend to the personal injuries sustained by him as a result of his falling into the hole?"
The court answered the question in the affirmative stating:
"The authorities are clear that where the complaint is for trespass
to land the trespasser becomes liable not only for personal injuries resulting directly and proximately from the trespass but also for those
which are indirect and consequential."
To support its holding the court relies upon the statements made in the Reitatement of Torts2 where it is stated that:
"A trespasser on land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
to the possessor thereof... by any. . .condition created by the trespassr
while upon the land irrespective of whether the trespasser's conduct is
such as would subject him to liability were he not a trespasser.
ThL holding of the court takes a long standing Pennsylvania doctrine, that is,
that an innocent trespasser is liable for (1) damages to the land and (2) damages which are the direct and proximate consequence of his act or acts, and extends it to the point where he will bt liable for all damages including those which
are indirect and consequential. In order to support its position the court relies
upon the case of Troth v. Willss in which a divided court decided that injuries
caused by a trespassing cow are compensable. This is the only Pennsylvania authority relied upon by the court though numerous out-of-state decisions are noted
by the learned justices.
A careful examination of Pennsylvania law upon this subject will reveal, as
is pointed out by Justice Bell in his vigorous dissent, that Pennsylvania has limited
the situations where a trespasser may be held absolutely liable for damages resulting from his trespass. The situations are these: (1) Where there is a severS Section 380.
8 8 Pa. Sup. 1.
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ance of timber, which is a direct injury; (2) injuries resulting from a trespassing
cow as mentioned previously and (3) damages resulting from blasting, which is a
hazardous activity and dealt with not on the basis of trespass but rather because of
the inherent nature of the act.
The theory of absolute liability as pointed out by the dissent is based upon
the Medieval theory that a man's home was his castle and inviolable. This theory
is contrary to modern philosophy and every day thinking. The theory of absolute
liability it is believed should be limited to situations where stare decisis requires
that it be used or to situations where the legislature expressly requires that it be
used.
4
In the case of Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Company the
court said:
"In our state, the doctrine of absolute liability has been invoked,
almost without exception, only in that small group of actions which redress injuries to land, and it is only as to those that it can be fairly said
that the doctrine prevails."
The court in this same case gos on to point out the fact that throughout the
Pennsylvania law the underlying policy considerations are in favor of no liability
without fault unless it is applied in a number of highly restricted areas and that
it is not looked upon with any degree of favor in this state.
It should also be noted that if the majority of the court are to support this
theory of absolute liability it is difficult to see how the additional defendant,
Sedwick, is free from liability. The jury, it would seem, returned a verdict of not
guilty on his behalf either because he was not negligent or because the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent. If the former be the case then Sedwick would still
be liable for the injuries sustained under the theory of the case as set forth by
the majority of the justices. On the other hand, if the latter be true, then the Bell
Telephone Company is also free from liability. The status of Sedwick under either
of these theories, that is as to whether he is an agent, employee, or independent
contractor, would have no bearing upon his liability.
The conclusion to be drawn from this case is not yet clear, for the case stands
uniquely alone in the law of Pennsylvania. There has been no case to follow it
and it has no predecessor. At least we might say that it may be a reversal of policy
by the courts of the Commonwealth or it may be distinguished by later decisions
as is often the case with an unfavorable ruling.
H. Edwin Mountford
Member of the Senior Class
4 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302, 124 A.L.R. 968 (1939).

